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PRIVATE LAWYER IN DISGUISE? ON THE ABSENCE OF 
PRIVATE LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI’S WORK 
Ralf Michaels* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Studies on the historical uses of particular concepts or doctrines should 
also trace their connections with the parallel concepts and doctrines 
within neighbouring areas such as private law, international relations or 
political theory and philosophy.1
“Human rights are like love,” Koskenniemi suggests, “both necessary and 
impossible.”2 An eccentricity? Equations of law and love may seem like the stuff 
of poets,3 not legal theorists, let alone practitioners.4 And yet, Koskenniemi, the 
leading public international lawyer, finds among legal theorists an unlikely ally in 
his claim that law and love are interrelated. Ernest Weinrib, perhaps the leading 
North American theorist of private law, makes the same claim for private law that 
* Arthur Larson Professor of Law, Duke University. Thanks are due to Jeff Dunoff for his 
extraordinary patience and valuable suggestions, as well as to Karen Knop. 
1. Martti Koskenniemi, Why History of International Law Today?, 4 RECHTSGESCHICHTE
61, 64–65 (2004). 
2. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, Human Rights, Politics, and Love, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 153 (2011) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW]. Love features so prominently (and problematically) elsewhere in 
Koskenniemi’s more recent work that the theme would deserve a whole article of its own. See,
e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 598 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA] (“[C]onsensus-seeking (like appeals to love) may often hide a subtle 
authoritarianism.”); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 502 (2002) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS] (“[The culture of formalism] insists that absent the possibility of building 
social life on unmediated love or universal reason, persuading people to bracket their own 
sensibilities and learn openness for others, is not worthless.”); Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and 
International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 11 (2011) [hereinafter
Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law] (“Love is often difficult to distinguish from a 
desire to dominate – which is not to say that no distinction should be made between them.”). 
3. See, e.g., W.H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, in COLLECTED POEMS 262, 262–64 (Edward 
Mendelson ed., 1991). 
4. With exceptions. See The Honorable Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, Griffith 
University Graduation Ceremony: But the Greatest of These is Love (Dec. 16, 2008) (transcript 
available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/kirbyj/kirbyj
_16dec08.pdf) (discussing the importance and role of love in politics and life). I thank Mary 
Keyes for pointing out this lecture to me. See generally DARYL DELLORA, MICHAEL KIRBY:
LAW, LOVE AND LIFE (2012).
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Koskenniemi makes for human rights: “private law is just like love.”5
Does that not mean, logically, that human rights are like private law? In one 
way, this parallel between two scholars is certainly a coincidence. It is hard to 
imagine that either Koskenniemi or Weinrib had the other in mind when they 
wrote about love. Indeed, it is hard to think, at first, of two authors more distant 
from each other. One of them works exclusively in public international law, the 
other exclusively in private law. One of them is a crit (though one with a peculiar 
bent), the other a formalist. One of them increasingly writes in a historical vein, the 
other draws on philosophical traditions. (Both, however, share an admiration for 
Kant, though Koskenniemi’s admiration seems more ambivalent). 
And yet, I suggest that the surprising parallel does suggest that such a 
connection between Koskenniemi’s work and private law not only exists but also 
helps shed new light on Koskenniemi’s work. Such a connection is not 
immediately apparent in Koskenniemi’s own work. Although Koskenniemi’s work 
is incredibly far-reaching as concerns public international law, private international 
law is almost completely absent from it. Even the proclaimed unity of public and 
private international law, a prominent theme in the nineteenth century (and again 
today) is discussed at some length, as far as I can see, only in brief passages of an 
unpublished paper.6 Similarly, substantive private law appears, prominently, only 
in one recent article.7 If Koskenniemi is a private lawyer in disguise, as my title 
suggests, then the disguise has so far been quite complete. A discussion of private 
law and private international law in Martti Koskenniemi’s work is, largely, the 
discussion of an absence.
I speak, deliberately, of an absence in, not an absence from, Koskenniemi’s 
work. The absence of something is very much a presence.8 In an important sense, 
private international law and private law are, unavoidably, part of Koskenniemi’s 
work. This is so in a general and in a specific way. The more obvious general way 
is that we now know how public and private are neither neatly separate, nor 
collapse into each other. Rather, there is a public in the private, and a private in the 
5. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
6. Martti Koskenniemi, Nationalism, Universalism, Empire: International Law in 1871 and 
1919, at 15–20, 37–39 (Apr. 29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.helsink 
i.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/Columbia%200405.pdf. Koskenniemi gives a gracious nod to 
Karen Knop’s, Annelise Riles’, and my own work on a conflict of laws style as an extension of 
his critical project in Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 15 n.14 (2009). 
7. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law, supra note 2 (arguing that the 
development of a language of private rights was the key legacy of the Salamanca scholars). 
8. Jacques Derrida might speak of a trace. In a different context, the German theologist 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer expressed this beautifully and briefly before the Nazis murdered him: 
“Nothing can make up for the absence of someone whom we love, and it would be wrong to try to 
find a substitute; we must simply hold out and see it through. That sounds very hard at first, but at 
the same time it is a great consolation, for the gap, as long as it remains unfilled, preserves the 
bonds between us. It is nonsense to say that God fills the gap; God doesn’t fill it, but on the 
contrary, keeps it empty and so helps us to keep alive our former communion with each other, 
even at the cost of pain.” DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 176 
(SCM Press 2001) (1953). 
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public. Whereas the presence of the public in private law has been discussed at 
length by legal realists and their successors, the presence of the private in the 
public has received comparably scant attention. 
However, this suggests only that any discussion of public international also 
includes, somehow, elements of private law, even if that is not explicitly 
mentioned. I think it can be shown that Koskenniemi’s work has more specific 
affinities with private law, too. Several of Koskenniemi’s concerns—the relation 
between law and politics, the dichotomy between form and substance in legal 
argument, the challenge of legal fragmentation—bear specific affinities to private 
law discourse. And I also suggest that these affinities are not accidental—or 
somehow created by necessary structural characteristics of legal discourse. Instead, 
they emerge from proximity, both historically and structurally, between 
Koskenniemi’s particular take on law, and the history and structure of private law 
discourse.
In order to be able to make this argument, I should say briefly what I mean by 
private law, and how it transcends, or differs from, the subject matter traditionally 
understood as private law. I do not primarily mean private law as a legal discipline, 
with its own rules and institutions, because as such, it remains relatively separate 
from international law. Elsewhere, Karen Knop, Annelise Riles, and I suggest that 
private international law is not only a discipline, however—it is also a particular 
technique, a style.9 That technique and that style are not exclusive to the 
discipline—I believe they can be found in other areas as well. It is especially this 
style that I will try to trace in Koskenniemi’s work. At the same time, addressing 
private law as a style does not make its doctrine irrelevant. The style has developed 
largely in doctrinal discourse—in an important way, to be discussed later, it is
doctrinal discourse—and, therefore, private law matters also as a discipline. 
Viewing law as a style immediately raises concerns over the role of politics—
a concern that has always been Koskenniemi’s too. For this reason alone, I think, 
relating private and private international law as a technique to Koskenniemi’s work 
would be fruitful. But I also see at least three more specific parallels, each of 
which is discussed in one of the remaining sections of this article. The first parallel 
concerns the theme, developed especially in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, of 
international law as a system that limits, to some extent, what powerful states can 
do.10 Systematicity has been discussed most extensively in private law, and the 
connections with international law, elaborated especially by Hersch Lauterpacht, 
are worth a new analysis in light of Koskenniemi’s work. The second parallel 
relates to the fragmentation of public international law, a topic Koskenniemi 
addressed influentially both as an academic and as a member of the International 
Law Commission. I juxtapose these with private international law as a discipline 
that deals with a horizontal plurality of legal systems. The third parallel is between 
Koskenniemi’s (controversial) endorsement of a “culture of formalism,” exposed 
9. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique: 
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 656 (2012). 
10. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2. 
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in the epilogue of his The Gentle Civilizer of Nations and elsewhere, and the 
special role of form and technique in private law and private international law. 
II. SYSTEM AND PRIVATE LAW
Here is a battle European jurisprudence seems to have won. Law is a 
whole or in the words of the first conclusion made by the ILC Study 
Group, ‘International law is a legal system.’ You cannot just take one 
finger out of it and pretend it is alive. For the finger to work, the whole 
body must come along.11
In one way, the absence of private international law and private law in 
Koskenniemi’s work is unsurprising. Most contemporary scholars of public 
international law, especially—but by no means exclusively—in the European 
tradition,12 do not address questions of private law, or private international law.13
Thus, the schism between public and private international law is relatively firmly 
established as an institutional one, despite the frequent calls that the boundaries 
should be overcome or are even claimed to be nonexistent (claims made more 
often by private than public international law scholars).14
And yet, in Koskenniemi’s case, the relative absence of private and private 
international law is a little more interesting than in other scholars’ works. This is 
so especially because of Koskenniemi’s deep interest in critical theory and matters 
of disciplinary history. In critical theory, the breakdown of the public/private 
distinction has almost become a cliché. In the history of international law, private 
law and private international law reemerge repeatedly.15 Private law doctrine 
provided the basis (the “domestic analogy”) for the natural lawyers’ conception of 
international law as some kind of private law among states; it was discussed again 
as an analogy for international law in the twentieth century. Koskenniemi’s work 
rarely takes on these connections in full. But he does address them, and how he 
does so sheds light on his own approach. 
A.  Lauterpacht’s Private Law Sources and Analogies 
The best starting point to trace the absence of private law in Koskenniemi’s 
11. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public 
International Law].
12. See generally Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German Views on 
Global Issues, 4 J. OF PRIVATE INT’L L. 121 (2008). 
13. For a similar critique, see generally Christine E.J. Schwöbel, Whither the Private in 
Global Governance?, 10 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 1106 (2012). 
14. See, e.g., ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION ORDERING
OF PRIVATE LAW 211 (2009); Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism,
2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 347 (2011) (discussing how international law was eventually 
divided into public and private spheres and the benefits of bridging the two spheres). 
15. Th.M. de Boer, Living Apart Together: The Relationship Between Public and Private 
International Law, 57 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 183 (2010); Alex Mills, The Private History of 
International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2006). 
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work is in his texts on Lauterpacht, whom he has discussed perhaps more than any 
other scholar.16 Lauterpacht, in his early work, made the private law foundations of 
international law the core of his research; his first English monograph was called 
Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law.17 He opposed the strict 
international law positivism that rejected any private law analogies in public 
international law, and especially the idea that all international law rested on 
sovereignty, thus leaving no space for any law outside of the will of nations.18 In 
fact, he demonstrated widespread use of private law analogies in many areas of 
international law. And this seemed a good thing: “A critical examination shows 
that the use of private law analogy exercised, in the great majority of cases, a 
beneficial influence upon the development of international law . . . .”19
Koskenniemi, in his discussions of Lauterpacht, devotes comparatively little 
attention to this book and of Lauterpacht’s later monograph on international law’s 
function,20 but what he writes is important. Koskenniemi emphasizes Lauterpacht’s 
project as that of establishing that international law is a complete system,21 no less 
advanced or complete than other branches of law.22 In connection with that, he 
16. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht 1897-1960, in JURISTS UPROOTED:
GERMAN-SPEAKING EMIGRÉ LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 601 (Jack Beatson & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht] (following, in 
parts very closely, the article on the Victorian Tradition cited below); Martti Koskenniemi, 
Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
810 (2004) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International 
Criminal Law] (discussing Lauterpacht’s relevance for international criminal law); Martti 
Koskenniemi, Lauterpacht: the Victorian Tradition in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 215 
(1997) (exploring Lauterpacht’s work in international law). In addition, the book The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations emerged from Koskenniemi’s Lauterpacht lectures given in Cambridge in 
1998. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at xi. Its core was 
Koskenniemi’s earlier article on the Victorian tradition that later became, with changes, its fifth 
chapter.
17. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1927) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT]. Lauterpacht had treated questions of private law 
analogy earlier (and more critically). HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, DAS VÖLKERRECHTLICHE 
MANDAT IN DER SATZUNG DES VÖLKERBUNDES: ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR FRAGE DER 
ANWENDUNG VON PRIVATRECHTLICHEN BEGRIFFEN IM VÖLKERRECHT (1922). An English 
translation has been published as HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, The Mandate under International Law 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations, in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 29 (E. 
Lauterpacht ed., 1977). The subtitle translates as “[b]eing also a contribution to the question of 
the application of private law concepts in international law.” Id. at 29; see also id. at 51–61 
(discussing the application of private law concepts to international law). 
18. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 43–87. 
19. Id. at viii, quoted in KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, 
at 375 (alteration in original). 
20. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
(1933).
21. Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law,
supra note 16, at 812. 
22. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 366. 
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points out Lauterpacht’s emphasis on “the primacy of law over politics.”23 This all 
seems accurate, as far as it goes. However, from reading Koskenniemi one would 
hardly glimpse that the body of law Lauterpacht invokes is private law. Instead, 
Koskenniemi just speaks, vaguely, of the invocation of “individual rules,”24
“domestic law,”25 “municipal law,”26 “maxims of municipal jurisprudence and 
general principles of law.”27 From reading Koskenniemi’s account, it would seem 
that Lauterpacht chose private law for mere convenience—this was an area that 
would be familiar to domestic lawyers.28
But for Lauterpacht, the choice of private law was not arbitrary at all. He 
pointed out explicitly that where international lawyers have regard to domestic law 
they rarely find anything in criminal or administrative law; they have to go to 
private law.29 Indeed, even the reference to “domestic” or “municipal” law is 
inexact; Lauterpacht expressly rejected analogies with any one private law system 
and instead used only analogies with private law concepts and ideas common to all 
legal systems30—general principles of law like in Article 38(c) of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, which is central to his argument.31 Thus, it appears 
that, for Lauterpacht, establishing international law as a comprehensive system 
presupposes similarities with private law, not with any body of law.32
B.  Private Law and Natural Law 
But does Lauterpacht really mean private law when he says so? Maybe 
private law really was merely a placeholder for natural law? Note that 
Koskenniemi himself discusses explicitly the role of private law and natural law 
23. Id. at 379. 
24. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 53. 
25. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 366; 
Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht, supra note 16, at 616–17. 
26. Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht, supra note 16, at 618. 
27. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 364; 
Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht, supra note 16, at 617?18.
28. Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law,
supra note 16, at 815.
29. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 35. 
30. Id. at 34, 84–85. 
31. See id. at viii–ix (describing the significance of the enactment of Article 38(c) of the ICJ 
Statute). It is worth noting the influence the idea of general principles had on comparative law, 
from Schlesinger’s Common Core Project to the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts. See Axel Metzger, General Principles of Law, in I Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of European Private Law 777 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2009). 
32. Recently, the argument has been made that Lauterpacht’s thought should be understood 
as arising from Rabbinical Law: Reut Yael Paz, Making it Whole: Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
Rabbinical Approach to International Law, 4 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 417 (2013). I see no 
contradiction: the ideas the author identifies as Rabbinical (primacy of law over politics, jurists 
and scholars over sovereigns; id. at 442) are also those of private law. For more connections 
between Jewish law and private law, see Chaim Saiman, Public Law, Private Law, and Legal 
Science, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, and in BEYOND THE STATE: RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW 269 
(Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels eds., 2008). 
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within international law for another set of historical authors, namely the Late 
Scholastics.33 Here, he quite ingeniously points out that their international law 
writings should not be viewed in separation from their writings on private law.34
Rather, he suggests, convincingly, that private law and international law combine, 
in Vitoria and his contemporaries and successors, to form the law of empire.35
Thus, their project was not just, not even primarily, a humanitarian one.36 Rather, 
their contribution lay in “the development of a whole vocabulary that has since 
come to delineate the imperial dimensions of international law.”37 That vocabulary 
consisted primarily of (Roman) law notions.38 Koskenniemi discusses three, of 
which one (dominium) stems from private law, one (ius gentium) concerns, 
historically, mainly private law, and only one (bellum iustum) does not.39 And he 
emphasizes the extent to which a general concept of property provided the basis 
for a transnational law of commerce. But he also suggests that an important 
distinction existed, for the Late Scholastics, between moral theology and natural 
law on the one hand, and private law on the other.40
And yet, even if the Late Scholastics distinguished natural from private law, 
what they established as private law is what subsequently influenced natural law 
theory.41 In the familiar dichotomy of positive and natural law, the private law of 
individual states falls on the side of positive law, but private law as an (imagined) 
transnational law shares more with natural law. Grotius, a core figure in the history 
of (not surprisingly) both international and private law, treats the positive private 
law of the Netherlands separately from natural law, and natural law—as the basis 
of international law—is mostly private law.42
33. See generally Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law, supra note 2. 
34. Probably the corollary is true as well: their private law writings should not be viewed in 
isolation from their international law writings (as they usually are). For a recent example, see 
JANSEN, infra note 40. But cf. JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS—A CRITICAL HISTORY, 101–05 
(2013) (discussing what the Late Scholastics said about international law). 
35. See generally Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law, supra note 2. 
36. Id. at 11. 
37. Id.
38. See generally Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International 
Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25 (2005) (illustrating the role 
of Roman law concepts in international law). 
39. Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law, supra note 2, at 11–16. 
40. This may be contested. See generally NILS JANSEN, THEOLOGIE, PHILOSOPHIE UND 
JURISPRUDENZ IN DER SPÄTSCHOLASTISCHEN LEHRE VON DER RESTITUTION:
AUßERVERTRAGLICHE AUSGLEICHSANSPRÜCHE IM FRÜHNEUZEITLICHEN NATURRECHTSDISKURS
(2013) (suggesting that moral theology provides the foundation of private law in the Late 
Scholastics).
41. Similarly, “positivism emerged as a logical development of natural law in order to 
answer those practical questions that arose once a naturalist worldview had consolidated as part 
of educated European common sense.” Martti Koskenniemi, Into Positivism: Georg Friedrich 
von Martens (1756?1821) and Modern International Law, 18 CONSTELLATIONS 189, 190 (2008) 
[hereinafter, Koskenniemi, Into Positivism].
42. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (1625), available at
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucm.532377566x;view=1up;seq=1; HUGO GROTIUS,
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That same distinction between particular positive private law on the one hand, 
and general private law as quasi-natural law on the other, can also be found in 
Lauterpacht’s work. Granted, his fight against the autarky of international law 
from private law was part of his fight against the positivism of his time and, 
therefore can be viewed as an endorsement of some type of natural law.43 And 
indeed, he saw in private law the embodiment of equity and justice and thus 
invoked the natural law affinities of private law.44 But it still matters that this was 
private law. Lauterpacht criticized authors who claimed that what they used by 
analogy was not private law, but instead something called “general law,” “general 
jurisprudence,” or even “philosophy of law”—that general law, he pointed out, was 
drawn almost exclusively from private law; it was thus not very different.45 And 
when he opposed analogies with private law, he meant analogies with the 
(positive) private law of individual states, not the general principles of law.46 In 
other words, if private law serves as a placeholder for natural law, this makes it 
more, not less, important that private law, rather than some other body of law, 
serves as the foundation of international law. 
C.  The Role of System 
Why, then, is it relevant that Lauterpacht chooses private law, and why does 
Koskenniemi not pick up on this aspect? I suggest that for Lauterpacht, the main 
force of private law (rather than another body of law) as the foundation of 
international law lies not in its vocabulary or its scope of application. It lies in the 
specific affinity to the system that private law has traditionally had. Koskenniemi 
does not make that connection because he focuses on different aspects: In his work 
on the Late Scholastics, Koskenniemi focuses on private law, but not on its 
systemic character. In his work on Lauterpacht, Koskenniemi focuses on the 
systemic character of the law, but not on its explicit roots in private law. 
Koskenniemi therefore overlooks, unfortunately, the close relation between 
systematicity and private law. 
Where does the concern with the law’s systematicity and comprehensiveness 
come from in the first place? Mario Prost has recently shown, admirably, how 
unclear the concept of unity—and thus, by extension, systematicity—of current 
INLEIDINGE TOT DE HOLLANDSCHE RECHTS-GELEERTHEYD (1631) (on which see R.W. Lee, The
Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland (Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleertheyd)
of Hugo Grotius, TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 29 (1930)); Edward Dumbauld, 
Grotius’ Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland, 2 J. PUB. L. 112 (1953). 
43. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 7–8 (describing the conflict between the 
positivist and natural law schools of thought during the late nineteenth century and positivism’s 
emphasis on the self-sufficiency of international law); cf. id. at 50–51 (proposing that 
positivism’s emphasis on autonomy was a major reason for private law’s poor reception in the 
international public law domain). 
44. See id. at 67 (equating decisions made in accord with justice to decisions made based on 
private law). 
45. Id. at 34–37. 
46. Id.
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international law actually is today.47 Koskenniemi, with his rich background in 
public international law’s history, can provide parts of an answer: “Systemic 
thinking has always been a preserve of academics, especially German 
academics.”48 In two insightful recent pieces, Koskenniemi points out how much 
of current public international law thinking derives from German public law.49 He 
rightly points to the positivist, scientific, classificatory, and anti-political nature of 
German public law scholarship in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.50 He 
does not, however, take the further step of analyzing the extent to which this 
specific character of German public law scholarship itself emerges from German 
private law scholarship.51 For the nineteenth century, this emergence seems quite 
clear.52 Gerber and Laband, whom Koskenniemi rightly identifies as central to the 
foundations of an emerging German public law and, in consequence, public 
international law53 drew, in turn, on private law scholarship.54 Paul Laband not 
only did for public law what Friedrich Carl von Savigny had done earlier for 
private law; he explicitly drew on Savigny’s system of private law, almost copying 
his methodology.55 Without much exaggeration, one can say that the particular 
47. See generally MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
48. Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 559 (2002) [hereinafter Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern
Anxieties]; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Between Coordination and Constitution: International 
Law as a German Discipline, 15 REDESCRIPTIONS 45, 63 (2011) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, 
Between Coordination and Constitution] (naming systematicity as one theme of German thought 
on international law). 
49. Koskenniemi, Between Coordination and Constitution, supra note 48, at 45–46; 
Koskenniemi, Into Positivism, supra note 41, at 190–91; see also KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 179?265.
50. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 179?265.
51. See generally Ralf Michaels, Systemfragen des Schuldrechts, in II HISTORISCH-
KRITISCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB 1 (Mathias Schmoeckel et al. eds., 2007). 
52. This is not to say that all of German public law was invented in private law. See
Michael Stolleis, Die Historische Schule und das öffentliche Recht, in DIE BEDEUTUNG DER 
WÖRTER: STUDIEN ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR STEN GAGNÉR
ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 495, 495–508 (Michael Stolleis et al. eds., 1991) (explaining the origins of 
a historical school in German public law prior to, or at least [partly] independent of, the historical 
school in private law). 
53. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 183–85. 
54. See generally WALTER WILHELM, ZUR JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE IM 19.
JAHRHUNDERT: DIE HERKUNFT DER METHODE PAUL LABANDS AUS DER 
PRIVATRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1958). For a review in English, see A.G. Chloros, Book Review, 
8 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 425 (1959). For this reason, I would see less continuity between Gerber’s 
and Laband’s positivism on the one hand and Kelsen’s on the other than does Koskenniemi; 
Kelsen, unlike Gerber and Laband, argues from an explicit public law perspective. See also
WALTER PAULY, DER METHODENWANDEL IM DEUTSCHEN SPÄTKONSTITUTIONALISMUS: EIN
BEITRAG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG UND GESTALT DER WISSENSCHAFT VOM ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT IM 
19. JAHRHUNDERT 112 (1993) (describing Gerber’s conception of the connection between public 
and private law); MICHAEL STOLLEIS, PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1800-1914 (2001). 
55. See generally WILHELM, supra note 54; Chloros, supra note 54, at 426 (summarizing 
Savigny’s contributions). 
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juridical character of nineteenth century German public law is a private law style. 
Thus, for German academics, the search for a system has roots in legal 
philosophy, but it finds its greatest scope of application in private law. Indeed, the 
systematic character of law has long been an interest (one might even say an 
obsession) for private lawyers.56 One need only read the letters in which Bernhard 
Windscheid, a leading German private lawyer of the nineteenth century, analyzes 
the best order for individual technical rules in the new German Civil Code to 
appreciate the amazing importance of order and systematicity for private lawyers.57
This is not to say that private law entirely dominated systematization of public 
international law,58 but it appears correct to say that systematization was a concern 
for private lawyers more than for public lawyers, at least after the end of natural 
law systems. 
There is a reason for the particular interests private lawyers had in 
systematizing the law. Public law did not need to be coherent; each rule could 
derive its authority from the sovereign’s command. Private law could in theory be 
based on such a command as well, and in the twentieth century, the conviction 
grew that it actually does. Yet, for a long time it was considered instead as a law 
prior to the sovereign’s command—a law that transcends states in a way not 
dissimilar from the way in which international law transcends states. Sovereigns 
could interfere with this law, but they could not disrupt it altogether. This was so 
only because private law was able to develop its own, internal rationality, and this 
seemed possible only through systematization. Individual rules could not yield 
answers to hard cases (the perennial problem of legal formalism), but the system at 
large could be considered sufficiently comprehensive to make such answers 
possible.59
The realist critique of such attempts of systematization—which had 
predecessors in the nineteenth century already—made two important points. The 
first is a point that we also find prominently in Koskenniemi’s work on public 
international law: any system of law is necessarily internally incoherent, because it 
must attempt to combine opposing principles and sets of values.60 The second point 
is less obvious but perhaps more important. Systematization is an attempt to 
protect the law from political interference, the creation of a superstructure that 
shapes the way we think. A systematized private law is relatively immune against 
political interventionist law. Interventionist law stands necessarily isolated within 
the larger system, and the system may confine its scope to a minimum. Rules on 
56. The most comprehensive monography I am aware of is PAOLO CAPPELLINI, SYSTEMA
IURIS (2 Vols, 1984-85). 
57. See Werner Schubert, Windscheids Briefe an Planck und seine für Planck bestimmten 
Stellungnahmen zum Schuldrechtssystem und zum Besitzrecht der 1. BGB-Kommission, 95 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSGESCHICHTE—ROMANISTISCHE ABTEILUNG 283, 312–14 (1978). 
58. See, e.g., CARL BARON KALTENBORN VON STACHAU, KRITIK DES VÖLKERRECHTS
NACH DEM JETZIGEN STANDPUNKTE DER WISSENSCHAFT 286–305 (1847). 
59. For what follows, see generally Ralf Michaels, Of Islands and the Ocean: The Two 
Rationalities of European Private Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 139 
(Roger Brownsword, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Leone Niglia & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2011). 
60. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 590–96. 
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the strict interpretation of statutes that existed both in the common and the civil 
law are good examples. The German opposition to a specialized consumer law is 
another example—the critique may have been political, but it was also aesthetic: a 
consumer law would undermine the harmonious architecture of traditional law. We 
find these concerns also in public international law. Attempts to systematize the 
law were attempts to free the law from the eccentricities of sovereigns and thus 
give international law any relevancy at all. 
Lauterpacht’s suggestion to use private law could thus be seen as an attempt 
to depoliticize international law. But this is not the only possible interpretation. His 
more direct project is to repoliticize international law as a system that goes beyond 
the mere exercise of sovereign discretion. That idea—to save international law 
from pure power—is a project that still seems attractive to Koskenniemi as well, 
particularly in light of neorealist and impoverished visions of international law, 
presented especially by some American authors, as being no more than that. This 
project—to save international law from the mere exercise of brute power—is what 
inspired the quote about international law as the gentle civilizer of nations, which 
Koskenniemi borrowed from George Kennan.61 Moreover, it highlights one aspect 
that international law and private law share. Both are, in an important way, not the 
laws of a state. Of course, international law is based, to a large extent, on states’ 
actions. Of course, private law has become a domain of the state. And yet, both 
areas of law still share a history, and also an attitude, that puts them beyond states. 
Therefore, their systematicity develops as a necessary alternative to sovereign 
command and creates an important point of conceptual overlap. 
III. PLURALISM AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
From the perspective of classical public international lawyers, conflicts 
between normative systems are, however, pathological.62
The question is never whether or not to go by law but by which law or 
whose law.63
Systematicity, as discussed in the previous section, creates and presupposes a 
certain degree of coherence. One of today’s concerns—Koskenniemi has called it 
an “anxiety”—in international law is that such coherence no longer exists, in view 
of the “fragmentation of international law.”64 Koskenniemi himself has worked 
extensively on fragmentation, both as an academic and as a member of the 
61. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at v (quoting 
GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 53–54 (Univ. Chicago Press 1984)). The epilogue, 
however, clarifies that Koskenniemi’s claim is not, as is often thought, that international law 
today actually functions as a “gentle civilizer.” He is quite explicit that the idealism that inspired 
the gentle civilizer idea represented a historical period and that that period is over. Id., at 510–17. 
62.  Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern Anxieties, supra note 48, at 560. 
63. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at xiv. 
64. See Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern Anxieties, supra note 48, at 553–56 (providing 
specific instances of concern or anxiety among the international legal community). 
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International Law Commission.65 Again, there are important, but underexplored, 
affinities between Koskenniemi’s work on public international law and the modes 
of thought in private law, in this case especially private international law.66
A.  Fragmentation and the Fragmentation Report 
Fragmentation was considered an issue, sometimes even a problem, in 
international law before Koskenniemi addressed it, but Koskenniemi has certainly 
been instrumental in bringing it to prominence, both through scholarly 
publications67 and his leading role in the International Law Commission Report on 
Fragmentation.68 Koskenniemi’s own position on fragmentation (like on many 
other issues) is deliberately ambivalent. On the one hand, he discards the anxieties 
over fragmentation as a fear for loss of control, expressed, not surprisingly, most 
often by representatives of the International Court of Justice.69 Here, Koskenniemi 
cuts through the claims for order and system and points to their underlying 
political motivations. On the other hand, he expresses fears that fragmentation will 
lead to a “managerial approach . . . that envisages law beyond the state as an 
instrument for particular values, interests, preferences” and would thus “give up 
the universalism that ought to animate international law and provide the conditions
within which international actors may pursue their purposes without subscribing to 
those purposes itself.”70
65. See Tomer Broude, Keep Calm and Carry On: Martti Koskenniemi and the 
Fragmentation of International Law, 27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 279 (2013) (describing 
Koskenniemi’s contribution to the fragmentation debate). 
66. I ignore here discussions on the fragmentation of private law, though those are 
prominent too. See generally COHERENCE AND FRAGMENTATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
(Pia Letto-Vanamo & Jan Smits eds., 2012); Christian Joerges, Die Überarbeitung des BGB-
Schuldrechts, die Sonderprivatrechte und die Unbestimmtheit des Rechts, 20 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ
166 (1987); Gunther Teubner, After Privatization? The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 51 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 393 (1998); Thomas Wilhelmsson, Private Law in the EU: Harmonised 
or Fragmented Europeanisation?, 10 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 77 (2002). 
67. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 
334; Martti Koskenniemi, Formalism, Fragmentations, Freedom: Kantian Themes in Today’s 
International Law, 4 NO FOUNDS. 7 (2007); Martti Koskenniemi, Hegemonic Regimes, in
REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 305 (Margaret A. 
Young ed., 2012); Martti Koskienniemi, International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism 
and the Ethos of Legal Education, 1 EUR. J. LEG. STUD. (2006) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, 
Constitutionalism]; Martti Koskenniemi, Legal Fragmentation(s). An Essay on Fluidity and 
Form, in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GUNTHER TEUBNER 795 (Gralf-
Peter Calliess, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Dan Wielsch, & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2009); 
Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern Anxieties, supra note 48; Martti Koskiennemi, Global Legal 
Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought (March 5, 2005), http://www. 
helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d%5b1%5d.pdf.
68. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1?June 9, July 3?August 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, as 
corrected U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr. 1 (Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Int’l Law Comm’n] 
(finalized by Martti Koskiennemi). 
69. Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern Anxieties, supra note 48, at 574?79.
70. Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism, supra note 67, at 2. 
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The concern with fragmentation is not just a concern with our intellectual 
ability (or inability) to conceptualize, systematize, or order the law, a concern 
mentioned in the previous section. It is also a concern over political realities—
“hard facts.” If Koskenniemi is more concerned about fragmentation than some of 
his intellectual allies,71 his unease is simultaneously intellectual and political.72 The 
intellectual concern is that fragmentation can lead to the loss of a comprehensive 
understanding. The political concern is that fragmentation can prompt the decline 
of international law into technocratic and particularistic discourse. 
However, students of fragmentation have long seen themselves between a 
rock and a hard place. They have often tried to resort to legal tools borrowed from 
domestic legal systems that tell us how to deal with conflicts within one legal 
system.73 The problem with such an approach is, however, that the tools from 
domestic law—lex posterior, lex specialis, etc.—were developed for the relatively 
coherent systems of domestic law that have a hierarchy of norms and institutions, a 
central legislator, and highest courts with comprehensive jurisdiction. These tools, 
therefore, become increasingly difficult to apply the more international law 
behaves not like a system, but instead like a multitude of subsystems. 
Alternatively, it seems that students of fragmentation could accept fragmentation 
and pluralism, and give up attempts to resolve the ensuing conflicts through legal 
means. Instead, they could resort to politics and deliberations as a way to resolve 
such conflicts.74 In other words, the legal tools are not fitting and the fitting tools 
are not legal. 
The fragmentation report75 takes, by and large, the first route, no doubt in part 
because Koskenniemi felt that the path through legal tools, inadequate as they may 
be, was more promising than political deference to specialized experts. The 
report’s main goal is systemic integration.76 It addresses at length principles like 
lex specialis derogat lege generali,77 lex posterior derogat lege priori,78 norm 
hierarchy,79 and, explicitly, systemic integration.80 In this approach (as in the 
71. See, e.g., NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE
OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010); David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal 
Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641 (2007). 
72. See Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern Anxieties, supra note 48, at 578 (calling for a 
more direct approach when dealing with issues of fragmentation beyond relying on 
“reasonableness”).
73. For the earliest and most comprehensive such study, see generally JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
74. See, e.g., KRISCH, supra note 71, at 69–103 (arguing for the virtues of pluralism and 
making a case for its utility in international law). 
75. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 68. 
76. Id. at 25–28. 
77. Id. at 30–115. 
78. Id. at 115–65. 
79. Id. at 44. 
80. Id. at 206–13. 
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literature on fragmentation more generally), self-contained (special) regimes81
become problematic. The report emphasizes “the need of a residual application, or 
a ‘fall-back’ onto the general law” when existing standards are diluted82—an 
approach very much in accordance with Lauterpacht’s emphasis on international 
law as a comprehensive system. 
B.  The Forgotten Private International Law 
Fragmentation is a puzzle because conflicts are pathological for public 
international lawyers.83 By contrast, such conflicts are the very foundation of 
private international law. Therefore, it is puzzling that the fragmentation report 
lacks, almost completely, references to the legal discipline that deals explicitly 
with conflicts between legal rules, namely conflict of laws. This is something of a 
surprise. When Koskenniemi suggests, “[t]he question is never whether or not to 
go by law but by which law or whose law,”84 he uses, without acknowledging (or 
perhaps even recognizing) it, the very definition of choice of law. The discussion 
in the report concerning the difference between jurisdiction and applicable law 
marks a core theme of private international law.85 Indeed, Koskenniemi reports that 
already sixty years earlier Jenks had proposed analogies to conflict of laws to deal 
with fragmentation.86 And yet, where conflict of laws is discussed in the report at 
all, reference is made only to the few attempts (by Teubner and others) to transfer, 
by way of analogy, insights from conflict of laws to the functional differentiation 
of world society,87 which is only a small subset of the legal conflicts in 
international law. 
This lack of attention to conflict of laws may be explainable, in part, through 
Koskenniemi’s admitted relative lack of expertise in private international law.88
Indeed, Koskenniemi’s work, so rich in other respects, is almost devoid of any 
discussion of private international law. Indeed, whereas historians of private
international law are usually very aware of the relation,89 public international 
81. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 68, at 65–100 (discussing how self-contained 
regimes become problematic with increased fragmentation). 
82. Id. at 73. 
83.  Koskenniemi & Leino, Postmodern Anxieties, supra note 48, at 560. 
84. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at xiv. 
85. See id. at 247–50 (exploring how domestic jurisdiction translates into a distinction 
between public and private international law); Knop, Michaels & Riles, supra note 9, at 632–34 
(discussing the splitting of jurisdictional questions from choice of law questions and the 
differences related to both). 
86. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 10 (referring to C. Wilfred 
Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 403). 
87. See id. at 10–11 (discussing how legal argument proceeds from a system of functional 
differentiations and analogously arguing that international law arguments and doctrines are a 
contingent surface of a socially shared manner of visualizing international law). 
88. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Case for Comparative International Law, 20 FINNISH
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2009) (“I am envious of Italian colleagues, for example, whose association 
with private international law has given them an ease with conflicts of laws my public law 
orientation lacks”). 
89. See Mills, supra note 15, at 7–15 (discussing how the conflict of laws and private law 
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lawyers, by contrast, frequently ignore private international law.90 But the lack of 
attention may also arise from the fact that private international law, until recently, 
has been largely confined to conflicts between the laws of states. Therefore, it was 
not a discipline of legal fragmentation either. 
Still, it can be useful for the fragmentation of international law, but not in its 
traditional shape. In order to be relevant for public international lawyers, private 
international law would need to be translated back into public international law. In 
particular, it would be necessary to draw from private international law thinking a 
new conflict of laws approach that goes beyond the traditional focus on conflicts 
between state laws and encompasses conflicts between legal regimes. 
Two such approaches exist. One approach, associated with Gunther Teubner 
and his co-authors, and briefly discussed in the fragmentation report, suggests that 
legal fragmentation is a mirror of the functional differentiation of world society—
different regimes represent different rationalities that are relatively autonomous 
from each other.91 In earlier writings, Teubner had already suggested to translate 
the idea of conflict of laws to the relations between systems in systems theory.92
More recently, he has attempted to translate this sociological approach back into 
the law.93 What emerges, however, is a conflict of laws that shares little with the 
actual doctrine. Because, as Teubner argues, societal conflicts between different 
functional regimes do not resemble the conflicts between state laws, traditional 
conflict of laws yields no responses. Instead, what is needed is a new substantive 
law.  
Although the approach is fascinating, his solution is, I suggest, something of a 
disappointment. First, the attraction of conflict of laws for systems theory (and also 
interact throughout history). 
90. See de Boer, supra note 15, at 184–85 (discussing how private international law is of no 
concern to scholars of public international law); see also PROST, supra note 47, at 19 (confining 
his discussion of the unity of international law to public international law). 
91. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 68, at 249 (discussing how the law in modern states 
emerges from quasi-autonomous sources); see also Gunther Teubner, De collisione discursuum:
Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality and Politics, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 901, 901–04 
(1996) (describing fragmentation and the idea that there is more than one rationality). 
92. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM chapter 6 (Zenon 
Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans.) (1993) (discussing an “intersystemic” 
conflicts law); Teubner, supra note 89 (explaining how the conflict of laws helps in systems 
theory).
93. See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 162–166 (2012) (arguing that the only way to protect 
the particularities of regional cultures is by using the language of modern law); Andreas Fischer-
Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004) (dealing with a conflicts approach 
to legal fragmentation); ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER, REGIME-
KOLLISIONEN: ZUR FRAGMENTIERUNG DES GLOBALEN RECHTS (2006); Gunther Teubner & 
Peter Korth, Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Transnational Regimes in the Double 
Fragmentation of World Society, in REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING
FRAGMENTATION 23 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012) (discussing different solutions for different 
legal conflicts). 
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for fragmented international law) was always that it allowed for the resolution of 
conflicts without a hierarchically superior viewpoint—every subsystem would 
draw the delimitation between itself and its environment. The substantive law 
approach, by contrast, presumes that there is a superior viewpoint from which the 
respective subsystems can be balanced. The conflict is thereby suppressed. Second, 
the approach works for functionally differentiated sub-regimes, but not really for 
other conflicts, for example between North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) law. 
Joost Pauwelyn and I have made a different proposal to use private 
international law for fragmentation issues.94 Our suggestion is that one should 
distinguish between intrasystemic and intersystemic conflicts in international law. 
Intrasystemic conflicts can be resolved with traditional rules from substantive law, 
like lex specialis, etc. Intersystemic conflicts, by contrast, require the development 
of actual conflicts rules. Although we suggest some guidelines on how such rules 
should be developed, we leave their actual development to further research. 
Recently, this suggestion has been taken up in the development of somewhat more 
concrete rules for the conflicts between intellectual property, trade, investment, 
and health law.95
It is not clear that the fragmentation report would have looked significantly 
different in result, had our approach already been developed at the time the report 
was drafted. It is unfortunate, however, that conflict of laws as a technique is all 
but absent from it. Arguably, the approach would have provided a way to avoid the 
unhappy choice between law that does not fit, and tools that are not law. It might 
have provided a way to retain the attractions of law, without sacrificing the insight 
that there is fragmentation. Thus, private international law offers something that 
private law cannot offer—a way of dealing with big political questions through law 
even in situations in which conflicts exist not just between different positions but 
between whole different rationalities.96
IV. FORM AND TECHNIQUE AND THE PRIVATE
In the absence of an overarching standpoint, legal technique will reveal 
itself as more evidently political than ever before.97
International law increasingly appears as that which resists being 
reduced to a technique of governance.98
94. See generally Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: 
Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law, in MULTI-SOURCED
EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (Yuval Shany & Tomer Broude eds., 2011), 
reprinted in 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (2012) (using private international law to resolve 
some fragmentation issues). 
95. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, A Conflict-of-Laws Approach to Competing 
Rationalities in International Law: The Case of Plain Packaging Between Intellectual Property, 
Trade, Investment and Health, 9 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 309, 330–33 (2013). 
96. See Knop, Michaels & Riles, supra note 9, at 656. 
97. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 516. 
98. KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 360. 
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Private law and private international law thus emerge as ways—techniques—
to deal with obviously political problems through the language of law. Thus, they 
should look appealing to Koskenniemi, who, particularly in his more recent work, 
has defended the language of law over other languages. So far, I have argued two 
ways in which this technique is made possible. Private law does so through the 
establishment of systems. Private international law expands on this for the 
communication with systems. What is lacking is a closer examination of the formal 
and technical way in which private and private international law achieve this, and 
whether that has particular lessons for public international law. 
In Koskenniemi’s own work, direct parallels between private law and public 
international law yield few answers. His discussion of the private law 
underpinnings of the Late Scholastics and their international law project, discussed 
earlier,99 is, in all its richness, a successor to leftist critiques of law, and especially 
private law, as superstructure to both enable and conceal the exercise of power and 
violence. Private law becomes complicit, indeed a major component, of the 
political project of empire, established and shielded from criticism through the 
language of law. Here, private law is deeply suspect. 
If we look elsewhere, however, we see important parallels. Recently, 
Koskenniemi has praised “a ‘culture of formalism’ as a progressive choice,”100
thereby angering many of his political allies. This approach to formalism invites a 
comparison with private law. After all, it is in private law that most debates on 
formalism have been held. What characterizes private law, at least in its classical 
version, is what is today often (and often misleadingly) called legal formalism. In 
turn, anti-formalist and instrumentalist approaches to private law regularly often 
deny its “private” character. This is not to say that only private law is necessarily 
formal, and Koskenniemi’s advocacy of a “culture of formalism” alone does not 
turn his project into a private law project. But it does open up a particularly 
promising avenue towards a comparison between his work and theoretical work on 
private law. 
A.  Anti-Instrumentalism and Form 
For this purpose, it is helpful to return to the juxtaposition, presented in the 
introduction, between Koskenniemi and Weinrib. Their most important similarity 
may be that both oppose instrumentalist conceptualizations of law. Koskenniemi 
asks about the purpose of international law and finds four purposes, the last of 
which is of particular relevance here: “international law’s objective is always also 
international law itself.”101 This self-referentiality flies in the face of most thinking 
not just in public but also in private law. But he could have borrowed the idea, 
again, from Weinrib who says almost the same thing about private law: 
99. See Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law, supra note 2, at 35–36. 
100. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 500–09 
(discussing formalism as a culture of resistance to power); see also KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 616. 
101. KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 266. 
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Private law . . . is to be grasped only from within and not as the juridical 
manifestation of a set of external purposes. If we must express this 
intelligibility in terms of purpose, the only thing to be said is that the 
purpose of private law is to be private law.102
What is the hope that lies in anti-instrumentalism and self-referentiality? For some 
time, viewing law as a tool seemed the best way to rip law from its inherent 
conservatism, to let it serve effectively towards progressive goals. This view of law 
as a tool has become commonplace today, even though the twentieth century has 
actually shown the limits of this perspective.103 These limits are not only practical; 
they are also ideological: law as a tool has become a tool for the powerful. In 
private law, this becomes most obvious in the economic analysis of law,104 which, 
although in principle should be ideologically neutral, has mostly enabled either 
conservative or centrist positions.105 In international law, similar political biases 
are present not just in neorealist views of international law as an extension of 
sovereign power, but more so perhaps in the concealed hegemonialism of human 
rights law.106 In fact, the main concern over instrumentalism is not that it promotes 
primarily conservative goals, but rather, that thinking about law as a mere means to 
an end, more generally promotes a restrictive view of law.107
When offered as an alternative to a dominant instrumentalism, legal 
formalism suddenly changes its character: it becomes an instrument not of 
conservatism, but of subversion. Weinrib, though certainly not a political radical, 
explicitly emphasizes the critical potential of formalism.108 Koskenniemi is more 
explicit: “[I]n a thoroughly policy-oriented legal environment, formalism may 
sometimes be used as a counter-hegemonic strategy.”109 “International law 
increasingly appears as that which resists being reduced to a technique of 
governance.”110 This is so not because it would be possible to ignore the eminently 
political character of the conflicts with which the law deals. Quite to the contrary, 
this is so because the political character of these conflicts requires a language with 
102. WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 5. 
103. See generally PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN 
TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (2001) (describing responsive law as a reaction to the 
limitations of regulatory law). 
104. ERNEST WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 302–06 (2012) (criticizing law and 
economics).
105. For possible alternatives, see 2 Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the 
Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 465, 468–73 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing how both conservatives and liberals 
manipulate the Kaldor-Hicks theory as needed to support their positions). 
106. For Koskenniemi’s own take on realism and instrumentalism, see, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI ,
THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 479–80, 485–87. 
107. See Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the 
Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 974–75 (2005) (explaining that instrumentalists limit their 
understanding of law to its instrumentality). 
108. See WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 23 (arguing that formalism provides insight into law’s 
senses of morality and rationality). 
109. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 602. 
110. Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, supra note 11, at 30. 
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which they can be addressed as something other than just clashes, a language that 
avoids the idea that pure power always wins. Koskenniemi makes this point so 
beautifully that this deserves a longer quotation: 
In the absence of agreement over, or knowledge of the ‘true’ objectives 
of political community—that is to say, in an agnostic world—the pure 
form of international law provides the shared surface—the only such 
surface—on which political adversaries recognise each other as such and 
pursue their adversity in terms of something shared, instead of seeking to 
attain full exclusion—‘outlawry’—of the other. Its value and its misery 
lie in its being the fragile surface of political community among social 
agents—states, other communities, individuals—who disagree about 
social purposes but do this within a structure that invites them to argue in 
terms of an assumed universality.111
He could have borrowed this idea from private law discourse. (And he and Weinrib 
may both be indebted to Kant here.) The idea that law has its own internal logic, 
and that this logic keeps the law insulated from outside projects, is, at heart, a 
private law idea. It is also this idea that has been responsible for much of the 
criticism of private law. Law professors in South Africa under apartheid have been 
criticized for teaching Roman-Dutch private law, while outside the classrooms 
there were riots. It is not always sufficiently appreciated to what extent the 
teaching of Roman-Dutch private law itself under these circumstances can have an 
emancipatory, even a subversive, character. 
If private law has its own logic, it becomes compatible with societies with 
deep internal fissures. It has sometimes been argued that private law presumes a 
relatively homogenous society; that it breaks down in the face of societal 
fragmentation. Thus, Koskenniemi’s Finnish compatriot Thomas Wilhelmsson has 
argued that the time for private law codification has necessarily passed.112 But the 
argument seems just as plausibly to run in the other direction: it is precisely in the 
face of societal fragmentation that private law, with its counterfactual reduction of 
individuals to legal subjects, provides a (fragile) common language for addressing 
social conflicts. German private law theoretician and historian Franz Wieacker has 
pointed out “that the BGB tried to reconcile several different value-systems which 
nineteenth century German society had allowed to coexist without coalescing; it is 
not the mouthpiece of a united social and political movement.”113 Koskenniemi 
seems to transpose this private law idea into public international law when he 
views the form of law as the only universalism that remains in view of political 
111. Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 
110–11 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
112. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Ethical Pluralism of Late Modern Europe and 
Codification of European Contract Law, in THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW:
EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 123, 136–40 (Jan Smits ed., 2005) (analyzing the 
complications of enacting a uniform European contract code). 
113. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 380 (Tony Weir trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1995); cf. Ralf Michaels, Why We Have no Theory of European Private Law 
Pluralism, in PLURALISM AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 139, 153–57 (Leone Niglia ed., 2013). 
34445-tic_27-2 Sheet No. 159 Side B      03/28/2014   08:22:45
34445-tic_27-2 Sheet No. 159 Side B      03/28/2014   08:22:45
ART. L LINE-BY-LINE MICHAELS (1997 VERSION - USE THIS).DOC 3/26/14 1:47 PM
518 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. [27.2 
clashes.114
B.  Technique and Politics 
A return to formalism is not an unsuspicious project, of course; it smacks of 
the kind of liberalism with its claim to neutrality that Koskenniemi opposed 
especially in From Apology to Utopia.115 The most important criticism, namely 
that law is neither neutral nor determined, can be found in Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS), much of which was devoted to private law. It emerges in Koskenniemi’s 
work and has justified referring to Koskenniemi as a proponent of CLS. It has been 
voiced yet more damningly against private law formalism. 
But the projects of (some) CLS proponents and of Koskenniemi are not the 
same. In the United States, much of the CLS critique of the biases within private 
law emerged as critique of law and legal language writ large: if law is really 
politics, it is argued, then its language should give way to the language of politics. 
Koskenniemi’s project is different. He does point out, especially in From Apology 
to Utopia, that law is neither neutral nor determined, that any such claim to 
neutrality and determinacy is ideological because it conceals the political element 
in societal conflicts.116 And yet, his response to these insights is not to give up on 
law. Koskenniemi’s theory of the role of legal doctrine is more complex and more 
interesting than that of many critics of law. On the one hand, he suggests that law 
is inseparably linked to its context.117 Law is, thus, political. On the other hand, he 
is adamant in his insistence that the language—or, as he puts it, the grammar—of 
law cannot be replaced by another language that can more forcefully resolve the 
problems law aims to solve—not economics, not international relations, not even 
(or especially not) politics.118 Thus, in the 2005 Epilogue in From Apology to 
Utopia, he argues: “[i]f the law is already, in its core, irreducibly ‘political,’ then 
the call for political jurisprudence simply fails to make sense.”119 “Little seemed to 
be gained by thinking about international legal argument as being ‘in fact’ about 
something other than law.”120 “[T]here is no other professional grammar (of 
‘international relations’, say, or ‘political theory’) in which the world’s problems 
114. See KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 505–06 
(claiming oppressed groups use the same form of law against their oppressors upon revolution). 
115. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 4–6 and passim.
116. Id. at 590–92. 
117. Id.
118. See Martti Koskenniemi, Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in 
Counterdisciplinarity, 26 INT’L REL. 3, 19–21 (2011) (emphasizing law’s dependence upon style 
and the method of framing an argument over reliance upon empirical data); see also Martti 
Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as a New Natural Law, 15 EUR. J.
INT. REL. 395, 416 (2009) (arguing the indeterminacy of international law allows competing 
views to work toward a standard of universality). I think this particular element in Koskenniemi’s 
critique—a critique of interdisciplinarity, or of replacing international law with international 
relations—is not grasped in the defense by Mark A. Pollack, Is International Relations Corrosive 
of International Law? A Reply to Martti Koskenniemi, 27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 339 (2013). 
119. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 601–02. 
120. Id. at 564. 
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would have been resolved in a more satisfactory way.”121
This is an endorsement of legal technique as it can be found, most purely, in 
private law, the discipline of legal technique par excellence. Of course, we may 
think that the practice of private law lacks this sophistication. We may think that 
private lawyers believe in the real existence of its concepts—property, contract, 
etc.—and do not recognize that these are only idealizations, simplifications, and 
reductions of actual social world events. And indeed, much private law argument, 
especially—but not exclusively—in the nineteenth century, appears to juggle 
antiseptical concepts as though law had nothing to do with real life. But this 
reading may be too ungenerous. Lauterpacht, for one, certainly thought otherwise. 
He endeavored “to show that it is precisely that empirical and sociological 
treatment of the foundations of the international society and of its needs which 
leads to the adoption of analogy to private law in the most essential parts of the law 
of nations.”122 Perhaps—and I have neither space nor time here to substantiate 
this—the experience in private law with technique, which is undoubtedly greater 
than in other legal disciplines, is also an experience in Koskenniemi’s project; the 
formulation of an internal logic not in ignorance of the surrounding circumstances, 
but rather in response to them. 
The question remains how such an apolitical language can be defended in 
view of the openly political nature of the issues with which it deals—a criticism 
that has been voiced repeatedly against Koskenniemi’s culture of formalism.123
Karen Knop, Annelise Riles, and I have suggested what we call an “as if” mode.124
Legal discourse, we suggest, can succeed only as a fictitious discourse—in 
awareness of the politics, but held as if the politics did not exist. Like 
mathematicians who use the concept of a line, while recognizing that such 
infinitely thin lines do not exist in reality, private lawyers recognize that formal 
private law discourse operates with fictions, and we have argued that these fictions 
are necessary to make meaningful statements.125
Koskenniemi might want to go further and assign more actual value to legal 
discourse as the actual language in which the problems of law are best 
presented.126 His perspective has always also been that of a legal practitioner, and 
121. Id. at 605. 
122. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 305; see also Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht,
supra note 16, at 810, 815–16 (discussing Lauterpacht’s work in relation to the role of individuals 
in international law). 
123. See, e.g., Jason A. Beckett, Rebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and the 
Critical Legal Project, 7 GER. L.J. 1045 (2006) (questioning the limits, radicality and utility, of 
Koskenniemi’s recent writings); Florian Hoffmann, An Epilogue on an Epilogue, 7 Ger. L.J. 1095 
(2006) (criticizing Koskenniemi’s “culture of legal formalism”); Paavo Kotiaho, A Return to 
Koskenniemi, or the Disconcerting Co-optation of Rupture, 7 Ger. L.J. 483 (2006) (arguing 
against what is seen as an idealization of international law). 
124. Knop, Michaels & Riles, supra note 9, at 645–46. 
125. Id.
 126. See also Ralf Michaels, Post-critical Private International Law: From Politics to 
Technique. A Sketch, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Diego 
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he—again like Weinrib127—prioritizes the viewpoint of lawyers on the law over 
that of others. When he suggests that, “[i]n the absence of an overarching 
standpoint, legal technique will reveal itself as more evidently political than ever 
before,”128 he appears to view this as a danger, but it may also be a promise. 
Politics is not absent from law but inseparably inscribed into it: “The politics of 
international law is what competent international lawyers do. And competence is 
the ability to use grammar in order to generate meaning by doing things in 
argument.”129 This is an understanding of law that—precisely because it is 
formally constrained130—is substantively liberating. In this understanding, the 
vernacular of private law does not cut off discourse; instead, it makes discourse 
possible. Private law theory may often have little to offer to this, even though the 
picture drawn by its detractors is not correct. Private law practice, however—and 
Koskenniemi has always emphasized the interrelation between theory and 
practice131—is the richest field by far for such experience. 
V. CONCLUSION
My claim is that, by concentrating merely on what [the men who are 
regularly thought of as the originators of international law] say on such 
public law issues as territory, jurisdiction, and formal war and by 
ignoring those aspects of their work that deal with the universal 
operation of property and contract, we receive a truncated and one-sided 
image not only of what they were doing but of the nature of the legal 
system that was emerging at the time when they were writing and that 
has persisted much more powerfully as part of global history than did 
any formal empire.132
In this quote, Koskenniemi suggests that to properly understand an 
international law scholar, we also must understand what she says about other areas 
of the law. In this article, I have suggested that to properly understand 
Koskenniemi, we should understand even what he does not say, explicitly, about 
other areas of law. I have suggested three themes in Koskenniemi’s work: system, 
fragmentation, and form. I have suggested that private law furnishes three 
Fernandez Arroyo & Horatia Muir Watt eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
127. See WEINRIB, supra note 5, at 15 (emphasizing the role lawyers play in building law’s 
“self-understanding” because they subordinate their own normative ideas to the cause of 
understanding the law itself). 
128. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 516. 
129. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 571 (emphasis omitted). 
130. See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 507 
(exploring the dichotomy between the rigid rule of law and the unfixed culture of formalism); see
also MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFT: PROBLEMS WITH WOMEN AND 
PROBLEMS WITH SOCIETY IN MELANESIA 180–82 (1988) (describing the efficacy of the 
“constraint of form”). 
131. Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 351,
356 (1999) (“I always have difficulties distinguishing [academic theory and doctrine] from each 
other”); see also KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 1–4 (describing the 
tension between normativity and concreteness in international law). 
132. Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
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responses to these themes—private law as a system, private international law as a 
legal discipline to deal with plurality, and legal technique as a way to treat political 
conflicts. Koskenniemi does not address these three responses explicitly. Yet, it 
seems to me they are implicit in what he says. Adding a private law perspective to 
his work does not seem to add a new dimension, but rather to highlight what is 
already there, albeit, as of now, as an absence. 
Even those who agree that the three themes are somewhat characteristic of 
Koskenniemi’s work may disagree with my implication that much can be learned 
from private law. Indeed, the actual contribution that private law knowledge could 
make to public international law in general, and Martti Koskenniemi’s work in 
particular, would require more detailed analysis than is possible here. And of 
course, Koskenniemi himself makes the argument difficult because private law is 
so absent in his work. And yet, just as he suggests that the Late Scholastics on 
international law must also be understood in light of what they say about private 
law, so I suggest Koskenniemi himself is understood in light of what he says, or 
does not say, about private law. 
I hope that a more general point emerges from these pages: several of 
Koskenniemi’s ideas, most openly perhaps the recent call for a “culture of 
formalism,” draw the ire of many because they seem to invoke something that we 
thought we had overcome: the idea that a depoliticized law is possible, let alone 
desirable. I do not think that a careful reading of Koskenniemi’s work really allows 
for such a criticism. But it seems relevant to point out that the idea of a 
depoliticized law is an idea that has been especially prominent in critiques of 
private law. In this sense, what Koskenniemi invokes (and what may be called 
post-critical law) is, at heart, an idea of private law that should be attractive to 
private lawyers as well—not the private law of its detractors, not perhaps even the 
private law of many private lawyers, but an understanding of private law that may 
be reemerging. The private law I have in mind is a law that engages through 
technique with its issues, in the knowledge that they are political, with the humility 
that a legal discourse can never do full justice to this political aspect, and yet in the 
confident knowledge that such a legal discourse is the only discourse with which 
we can hope to grasp social and political problems. The private lawyer I have in 
mind is the lawyer who uses the language—or grammar—of law in awareness of 
its politics, but also in awareness that no better language is available. In this sense, 
I hope it will be clear that the absence of private law in Koskenniemi’s work is 
very much a presence. And I hope that when I call Koskenniemi a private lawyer 
in disguise, it becomes clear why this is not an insult at all. 
